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ABSTRACT
Due to the recent increase in the
severity and frequency of natural
catastrophes, insurers believe that insured
losses from such catastrophes can exceed $50
billion. There is not enough capital
available in the insurance industry to cover
such catastrophic losses. Therefore, insurers
have begun looking for new sources of capital.
The most promising solution is in the capital
market, specifically in catastrophe insurance
options. The options have a settlement index,
which is the market's estimate of the losses
for the covered quarter. While these options
have advantages as well as disadvantages over
reinsurance. The main problem hindering the
market is the lack of a generally accepted
pricing model. Neither option pricing models
nor reinsurance pricing methods are suitable
for the severity of recent catastrophes.
Since a pricing model would probably
dramatically increase the popularity of
catastrophe insurance options, the search for
such a model is the source of great discussion
in the insurance industry.
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DEFINING THE PROBLEM
Until 1989, there had never been a natural catastrophe that had
cost the insurance industry more than $1 billion. Since 1989,
there have been six (Mooney 35). Events such as these have had a
dramatic effect on how insurers view their possible losses. Due
to the increasing severity, as well as the unusually high
frequency, of catastrophes over the last decade, insurers have
come to the realization that losses resulting from a catastrophe
have the potential to be much higher than originally estimated.
In fact, insurers now believe that losses can easily exceed $50
billion. This realization creates numerous problems in an
industry that was developed with the belief that such a
catastrophe would not cost more than $1 billion.
Once insurers came to the conclusion that catastrophes could
cost much more than originally believed, they immediately wanted
to cover their increased exposure. First, they looked toward
reinsurance companies for help in this area, since insurers
ordinarily decrease their exposure with this traditional hedge.
However, at the same time reinsurers came to the same conclusions
as primary insurers and were afraid to offer too much coverage.
As basic economic theory would predict, an increase in the demand
and a decrease in the supply for catastrophe reinsurance has led
to an increase in its price. A study conducted by the Reinsurance
Association of America, or RAA, found that premiums increased from
$11.3 billion to $12.8 billion, or 13.3%, during the first nine
months of 1995. Furthermore, reinsurance premiums are growing at a
faster rate than primary insurance premiums, which increased only
3.6% in the first nine months of 1995 (Gastel 2).
An extension of the problem is the shortage of capital in the
reinsurance market. Most large insurance companies are able to
obtain only $300-400 million In catastrophe reinsurance coverage
(Gastel1). There have been six catastrophes costing over $1
billion since 1989, including Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge
earthquake, costing $15.5 billion and $12.5 billion, respectively
(Mooney 35). In light of these figures, $300-400 million of
reinsurance seems grossly inadequate. For example, insurers who
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have a 1% share of a $50 billion catastrophe will suffer a $500
million loss. This is over the $400 million limit of available
catastrophe reinsurance coverage. In other words, even insurers
with a share as low as 1% cannot "layoff" their exposure in the
reinsurance market (36). As a result, primary insurers are
restricted in the amount of coverage they are able to write.
Hence, there is insufficient capital available in today's
reinsurance market to cover catastrophe losses in excess of $50
billion.
This paper will investigate a number of solutions to the
capital shortage problem. Catastrophe insurance options are the
most promising solution and I will therefore focus on them for a
more in-depth analysis. While these options are very similar to
reinsurance, there are differences, many of which are beneficial.
However, there are problems, the most prominent being the lack of
a pricing model. Catastrophe options trading is currently slow
because of these disadvantages. Fortunately, most of the problems
that are hindering catastrophe options are solvable. In fact,
with a generally accepted pricing model, catastrophe options could
be a very successful addition to the insurance industry.
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
"Act of God" Bonds

As the magnitude of catastrophe losses was brought to light,
insurers began searching for new sources of capital and as a
result, a number of solutions have been suggested. One new idea
is "Act of God" bonds. These bonds are designed so that a "major
disaster triggers some chill1ge in the underlying agreement" (Gastel
2). These bonds are issued by insurers and if a catastrophe
occurs, they do not pay all or part of the principal (Ceniceros
41). If a catastrophe does not occur, the bond holder receives
the principal at the maturity date of the bond. One can think of
it as receiving the claim payment in advance, with the stipulation
that if a catastrophe does not occur, the claim payment is
returned with interest. In exchange for this loan, the insurer
pays a higher than normal interest rate to the bond holder.
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Catastrophe Risk Exchange
Another new innovation is called CATEX, or Catastrophe Risk
Exchange. It was developed by former New Jersey insurance
commissioner Samuel Fortunato. Subscribers to the system are able
to trade "units" of risk, equivalent in dollar value, in order to
reduce their concentration of risk. CATEX uses a set of
benchmarks to measure relative values for different perils and
geographic locations, and prices are determined by the actual
relative loss experience between traded units of exposure (Koegel
49). To illustrate, a company could trade units of Florida
windstorm for equivalent units of California earthquake (Gastel
3). This electronic trading system is an ideal method for small,
local insurers to diversify their business. CATEX has the
potential to develop other innovations as well. For instance,
there has already been interest expressed in the financial
community to use actual transaction prices as an index for
secondary-market derivatives trading outside CATEX. Over-the
counter insurance derivatives trading by insurers has also been
suggested. This would cut off the peaks of exposure of the
primary company (49).
Surplus Note Transactions
In February of 1995, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company
pioneered yet another alternative to traditional reinsurance. In
an agreement with Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York,
Nationwide set up a trust fund which issued 30-year bonds to
institutional investors. The $400 million proceed p were then
invested in US Treasury securities, which served as collateral for
the bonds. If at any time in the next ten years, Nationwide needs
more financing, it can issue up to $400 million in surplus notes.
These notes can then be substituted for the US Treasury notes
which would allow Nationwide to pay its disaster claims. Under the
"no utilization" option, the cost to Nationwide is the difference
between the US Treasury security rate and the borrowing rate. If
a catastrophe were to occur, the cost would increase (Koegel 46).
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However, since the surplus notes are equity and not debt, this
would not reduce Nationwide's statutory surplus which means
Nationwide could write additional business (Gastel 2). Unlike
reinsurance, this coverage has no trigger. Nationwide can access
the funds at any time within the ten years, regardless of whether
or not a catastrophe occurs. This deal also differs from
reinsurance in that the note holder assumes the risk that the
issuing insurer could default on repayment after a catastrophe.
In the reinsurance industry, on the other hand, the reinsurer
assumes timing and underwriting risks (Koegel 46).
While "Act of God" bonds, CATEX, and surplus note
transactions are all viable solutions to the shortage of capital,
none seem to be attracting much interest from insurers. Luckily,
the Chicago Board of Trade offers yet another alternative, and
this once shows a great deal of promise. That potential solution
is catastrophe insurance futures and options.
Futures
The capital market is a natural place to look for large
amounts of coverage since United States private financial capital
totals over $13 trillion (Mooney 36). This is 100 times the $130
billion in capital that is available in the entire insurance
industry (Ray 74).
The Chicago Board of Trade first introduced catastrophe
futures on December 11, 1992. They represent hail, riot, flood,
earthquake, or wind loss experience and are available for four
geographical regions: Eastern, Midwest, Western, and National.
Insurers simply choose the contract which most accurately matches
their book of business (McCullough 32). The period covered by the
contract is called the loss quarter and these end in March, June,
September, and December. Brokerage fees are typically between $15
and $30 per contract. Settlement prices of the contracts are
determined by an index prepared by the Insurance Services Office,
or the ISO, and are based on the loss reports of a national pool
of catastrophe policies (Ray 76). The index is comprised of at
least ten of the 100 largest insurance companies that report to
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the ISO and they are chosen based on their size and diversity
(McCullough 32). To calculate the index, the ISO determines the
loss ratio, which is incurred losses divided by earned premium,
and then multiplies by $25,000, which is the face value of all
contracts. The ISO then multiplies this figure by an estimated
ratio of reported losses to incurred losses in order to account
for reporting lags. The resulting index is essentially the
market's expectations of a quarter's losses and premiums. If loss
expectations rise, future contract prices rise accordingly. There
is a three month reporting period, called a loss development
period or run-off quarter, after the end of the quarter, plus an
additional three months to collect and analyze the reports. Thus,
the final settlement of a contract actually occurs seven months
after the covered quarter (McLeod 34). For instance a June
contract, which covers the second quarter, would not be settled
until January.
CATASTROPHE INSURANCE OPTIONS
unfortunately, since their introduction pure futures
contracts have not done well. In fact, trading has been so poor
that Business Insurance reporter, Michael Schachner, has described
their activity as "dormant" ("CBOT CAT Instruments ... " 69).
Instead, there has been a shift from complete risk transfer
through futures to insuring layers of risk with catastrophe
insurance options, or CAT options (Lane and Lobo, A Simple
Approach 1). A catastrophe spread option is a bullish vertical
spread, which is defined as the buying one call option and writing
another with a larger exercise price but the' same expiration date.
It is called bullish because investors profit from a rise in the
underlying asset, vertical because it has two different exercise
prices, and a spread because it is made up of two options (Wilmott
38). These options are essentially "insurance without the
principle of indemnity" (Lane and Finn 2). In order to prevent
fraud, an insured is normally required to have an insurable
interest in the covered property. This means that the insured
must lose something if the insured property is ruined. Therefore,
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people cannot buy a policy to cover something they do not care
about, and then destroy it in order to receive the insurance
money.
Options are similar to futures, with the exception that the
owner has the right, but not the obligation, to settle at a
specific price within a specific period of time. Therefore if the
ISO ratio exceeds the option strike price, insurers would exercise
their options. The value of the option is the difference between
the index value and the strike price. Thus, if a catastrophe
occurred, the index value would increase and that difference would
help offset losses. On the other hand, if a catastrophe does not
occur, the strike price is not reached, and the seller keeps the
fee paid by the insurer. These scenarios are equivalent to an
insurer buying reinsurance and then filing a claim versus an
insurer purchasing reinsurance, filing no claims and losing the
premium. Call options are similar to reinsurance in that layers
of coverage can be obtained. These layers, or call spreads, are
accomplished by purchasing a call option at one price while
selling a call option at another price. The lower strike price is
equivalent to the ceding company's retention, which is essentially
a deductible for insurance companies. For instance, a company may
buy a call option with a 50% loss ratio and sell a call option
with a 75% loss ratio. This effectively allows the buyer to hedge
against a loss ratio within a certain range, in this case between
50% and 75%.
In 1995, in an effort to improve their product, the Chicago
Board of Trade announced that catastrophe options would be based
on loss estimates provided by the Property Claims Service, or PCS.
Following a catastrophe, PCS uses three techniques to arrive at
their loss estimates. First, PCS conducts a general survey of
insurers. This survey represents 70% of the market, based on
premium-written market share. Second, PCS utilizes the National
Insurance Risk Profile, or NIRP, which is an inventory of
buildings and insured vehicles in over 3100 counties in the United
States. An on-the-ground survey is the final technique utilized
by PCS (CBOT, A User's Guide 11). The PCS index is the total
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estimates of insured losses in the covered area during the
appropriate period divided by 100 million (CBOT, The New
Standardized Alternative 14). Thus, one point on the index is
equivalent to $100 million of losses industry-wide. The indices
represent nine different regions. They are National, Eastern,
Northeastern, Southeastern, Midwestern, Western, and 3 state
indices, Florida, Texas, and California. These three states are
considered "catastrophe-prone", and therefore rece've their own
index (2). The California and Western contracts have annual loss
periods because their catastrophes are not seasonal, while the
other seven regions have quarterly loss periods (4). Furthermore,
insurers can purchase contracts with loss development periods of
either six-months or twelve-months (5).
Premiums are quoted in points and tenths of points, each
point equaling $200 and each tenth of a point equaling $20 (16).
Strike values are listed in multiples of five points (15). PCS
also offers both "small cap" and "large cap" contracts. These
caps limit the amount of aggregate industry losses that can be
covered under a contract. A small cap contract covers losses from
$0 to $20 billion while a large cap covers losses from $20 to $50
billion (CBOT, A User's Guide 4). In other words, the small cap
contract settles at the lesser of (a) $200 x the settlement value
of the index or (b) $40,000 ($200 x 200 cap). A large cap
contract covers losses from $20 to $50 billion and settles at the
lesser of (a) $200 x settlement value of the index, with a lower
bound of $40,000 or (b) $100,000 ($200 x 500 cap) (CBOT, The New
Standardized Alternative 15,17).
ADVANTAGES OF CATASTROPHE INSURANCE OPTIONS
By utilizing catastrophe options, insurers can essentially
freeze their loss ratios, spread their exposure, and increase
capacity. These are obviously phenomenal advantages to insurers.
But catastrophe options have even more to offer. First, the
pricing index is straightforward, understandable, and easily
accessible, particularly with the PCS index. In addition, In many
ways CAT options offer more flexibility than reinsurance. First,
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options allow insurers to get a lower retention level since they
can buy coverage below the attachment point offered by the
traditional reinsurance market (CBOT, The New Standardized
Alternative 8). That is, insurers can obtain claim payments at
lower loss levels. Second, if insurers decide they have too much,
or not enough, coverage they can easily sell, or buy, more
options. In contrast, reinsurance prices and conditions are
locked in after lengthy and costly negotiations. This feature can
also help alleviate the volatility of the insurance industry. By
allowing easy entry and exit, capacity can rise and fall with the
industry's needs, thus "smoothing out" the peaks and troughs of
the insurance cycle ("USA... " 2). Third, insurers do not have to
worry about their premium relative to the rest of the industry.
Premiums of CBOT options are public and prices are the same for
all option users (CBOT, The New Standardized Alternative 5).
Fourth, reinsurers can diversify their business by selling
catastrophe options in a region where there is normally no
opportunity to write business (9). Fifth, insurers can use
catastrophe options to avoid reinstatement fees. Often, a
reinsurance contract will require such a fee after a catastrophe
occurs in order to keep the contract in effect. In other words, a
primary company must essentially buy a new contract, although at a
cheaper price, for the remainder of the period. However, if a
catastrophe occurs in September, an insurer could opt to purchase
a December contract to cover the remaining quarter rather than
paying a reinstatement fee (10). Furthermore, any new method for
covering catastrophic losses will increase competition for
reinsurers, which will lead to lower prices. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, PCS options are guaranteed by the Board of Trade
Clearing Corporation, or BOTCC. The BOTCC is a separate entity
from the exchange and it exists "to ensure the financial integrity
of all futures and options contracts traded at U.S. futures
exchanges" (CBOT, A User's Guide 60). Considering the BOTCC's
large amount of capital, there is, in fact, less risk of default
than there is with reinsurance.
After considering the simplicity, flexibility, and
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predictability of losses of catastrophe options, insurers may soon
begin choosing this new path instead of reinsurance. Yet trading
of catastrophe insurance options and futures on the Chicago Board
of Trade has been slow. If these derivatives have so many
positive characteristics that reinsurance does not, why are they
trading poorly?
Perhaps it is because despite their numerous
advantages, catastrophe derivatives also carry some distinct
disadvantages. These problems fall into into three categories:
the risk associated with the options market, the newness of the
market, and basis risk.
DISADVANTAGES OF CATASTROPHE INSURANCE OPTIONS
Risk Associated with the Market
Many still consider the capital market to be a "crapshoot"
(Ray 77). In other words, derivatives are high risk and
speculative, particularly for the often conservative insurance
industry. Derivatives are not the traditional way of doing
business, are often viewed as "trendy", and have not proven
themselves over the long term. This hesitancy is understandable
considering the fact that many insurance companies "pride
themselves on the simplicity and strength of their current
condition" (McCullough 35 ) .
The reputation of the capital market has caused a shortage of
buyers and sellers. Outside investors have not yet attempted to
play this new market. It was originally hoped that pension fund
managers would enter the market as sellers. However it was soon
discovered that such companies did not want to risk losing their
customers' pension funds. Perhaps Michael Smith, an industry
analyst with Lehman Bros. in New York, summed it up best when he
said "What? Pension funds betting on the weather? It better not
be mine or yours" (Schachner, "CBOT CAT Instruments ... " 72). This
lack of investors also creates a liquidity problem. Since the
CBOT wants contract prices to be based on the index rather than
demand, it has placed a limit on the number of purchases, sales,
or holdings that are allowed as long as the market is small.
However, this means that large insurers cannot buy enough to hedge
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properly and contracts cannot be bought or sold on short notice.
Consequently, a catch-22 is created. Liquidity would improve if
more companies participated in the market, but more companies will
not participate until liquidity improves (McCullough 35).
In order for any market to be successful it must have buyers
and sellers. While buyers and sellers of catastrophe insurance
options are scarce at the moment, there is a place for them in the
market. Investors just need to open their eyes to the
possibilities. The Chicago Board of Trade has identified three
groups of potential buyers: large insurers, reinsurers, and small
insurers (McCullough 31). Large insurers would utilize these
options because they have a well diversified portfolio risk.
Therefore, their losses are more likely to correlate with the
index. They also have more historical data in order to compare
their loss history with the index over several years (33). The
same advantages are true for reinsurance companies. In contrast,
small insurance companies would buy more regional contracts than
national contracts. They would also have to look more closely at
their historical data in order to see how their losses correlate
with the index. However once this is determined, they should be
able to decide which contracts are best for them (33).
Next, the market needs sellers of catastrophe options. Bill
Scott, Finance professor at the Katie Insurance School at Illinois
State university said, "To play in this market you have to have
deep pockets. Sellers can build up some pretty major capital over
several years. But if something like Hurricane Andrew hits, you
can meet God in a hurry" (Schachner, "CBOT Cat Instruments ... "
71). Fortunately, there are potential investors who have deep
enough pockets.
Hedgers are one group of sellers who could utilize these new
products. Since catastrophe options are uncorrelated with bond
prices, investors could use the derivatives to diversify their
portfolios (CBOT, The New Standardized Alternative 2). As an
employee of Guy Carpenter said, "Insurance risk can be considered
an asset class. And it's diversification for investors"
(Schachner, "Protecting Against the Big One .•. " 5). Building
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supply firms and construction companies could also benefit from
selling catastrophe insurance options. Their profits after a
catastrophe are inversely related to that of the insurance
industry. Their demand increases due to repairing damaged
buildings. Likewise, if insurers have low claims following a
catastrophe, construction companies have a low demand. These
players could add depth and liquidity to the market (McCullough
33) •

Others may want to enter the market as speculators. A study
conducted by Lane Financial of Chicago found that speculators can
make a profit by selling these derivatives. Tables IIa and lIb
compare the relative premiums of catastrophe spreads to the
relative premium of T-bond spreads using prices for the 1994
September Eastern contract.
TABLE Ua: Relativ Premium of 40/60 CAT Option vs. T-bond
(A)
(B)
Prob. Prob.
(C)
Lower Upper
Above Above
Futures Strike Strike
Lower Upper Market
Position Price Price Price Volatility Leg
Leg Premium
CAT
option

T-Bond

40

118

J24

60
125.37

13.64% 9.09%
9.41%

(C)
Black
Model
Premium

6.5

13.64% 9.09%

Relative
Premium
IC/(B-A)I
32.5%

0.1531

11.15%

TABLE lIb: Relative Premium of 100/120 CAT Option vs. T-bond
(A)
(B)
Prob. Prob.
(C)
Lower Upper
Above Above
Futures Strike Strike
Lower Upper Market
Position Price Price Price Volatility Leg
Leg Premium

CAT
option

T-Bond

118

100

120

126

127.14

9.11 %

6.82%

4.55%

6.82%

4.55%.

(C)
Black
Model
Premium

3.5

R lative
Premium
IC/(B-A)]
17.5%

0.0634

5.57%

(Lane and Lobo, More Premium 2-3)
Lane Financial chose the strike prices of the spread so that
the probability of the lower strike of the bond option finishing
in-the-money is the same as the probability of the lower leg of
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the CAT spread finishing in-the-money.

Similarly, the probability

of the upper leg of the bond option finishing in-the-money and the
upper leg of the CAT option finishing in-the-money are equal (Lane
and Lobo, More Premium/Less Risk 1). The catastrophe insurance
probabilities are based on histograms from simulated settlement
values for the September Eastern Catastrophe index using a 10%
constant growth rate while probabilities for the T-bond were
computed using the Black futures option model (1).

Technically,

when the risk of these two options are equal, their relative
premiums should be equal as well.

However, the relative premium

for both the 40/60 and the 100/120 CAT spreads are approximately
three times that of the bond call spread.

In other words,

catastrophe spreads offer much more premium for the same amount of
risk.

This suggests that catastrophe spreads may be overpriced.

Or "perhaps the market is pricing in features that are presently
unknown"

(2).

No matter what the reason, it is definitely an

incentive for sellers to enter the market.
Thus, insurance catastrophe options are desirable for
speculators as well as hedgers.

When these sellers are added to

the three groups of buyers suggested by the CBOT, large insurers,
small insurers, and reinsurers, a market for these options becomes
a very real possibility.
A New Market

The second category of problems arise from the fact that the
market is still very young.

While the Chicago Board of Trade is

finding ways to improve upon the product every day, CAT options
were introduced just four years ago, in December of 1992.
Regulation, which differs from state to state, is a prime
example of a problem resulting from the newness of catastrophe
options.

For instance, California's insurance code requires that

"the insurer's relevant underwriting experience or insurance
related risk exposure bear a correlation to the risk exposures of
the index underlying the insurance ••. options thereon entered into
as part of the hedging transaction" (Koegel 48).

If that

correlation ceases to exist, the contract will be terminated as
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soon as possible (48). Illinois was the first state to address
regulatory standards for catastrophe derivatives (McCullough 34).
Here it was decided that insurance derivatives would be allowed
but they must be treated as investments rather than reinsurance
(Koegel 48). Many states, following Illinois' lead, have
investment-basket clauses. In order to prevent the profitability
of insurers from being dependent upon the outcome of their
investments, they are prohibited from having "baskets of
investments" (McCullough 34). This means that regulators have
placed limits on the amount of investments insurers can hold and
on the riskiness of those investments. Consequently, the amount
of coverage insurers are able to obtain through the capital market
is usually significantly lower than the amount needed for an
effective hedge (31). Within the area of regulation, accounting
procedures are a concern. Currently, there are no standards for
accounting procedures for catastrophe insurance derivatives. This
is creating a sense of confusion about the market, which only
serves to hamper its success even further (34). In order to be
completely successful, catastrophe derivatives will need
appropriate decisions from state regulators. Proper regulation
could provide a favorable atmosphere and at the same time, assure
the general public that options will not affect the stability of
their insurance companies. Currently however, most regulatory
bodies are not making any decisions. They are waiting to see how
accurately catastrophe derivatives perform (McCullough 34).
Another problem associated with the new options is that they
are only available on the Chicago Board of Trade. The market has
not had time to expand and is therefore geographically limited to
the United States. This is obviously a problem for insurers with
international catastrophe coverage. On the other hand, a study
conducted by Swiss Reinsurance Company based on 1992 data found
that at $30.6 billion in premiums, the United States is the
largest supplier of reinsurance among top nations. The study also
concluded that the United States has the highest demand for
reinsurance. In fact, insurers here pay $43.3 billion in premiums
for business ceded and retrocessions, which is reinsurance for
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reinsurers. That translates to 28.9% of the world-wide non-life
reinsurance premiums (Gastel 1). In other words, although options
are limited to the United States, a significant portion of the
world-wide market is able to utilize this hedging technique.
Furthermore, the market could eventually expand internationally.

Basis Risk
Basis risks, which are "risks arising from differences
between the way the property/casualty insurance market works and
the way the [Chicago Board of Trade] ... market works" (McLeod 35).
An example of a basis risk is the limited reporting period. The
settlement date of a contract allows only a three month reporting
period after the covered quarter. Thus, if there is a significant
amount of incurred-but-not-reported losses, or IBNR, the
settlement price of a contract will not accurately reflect losses.
Therefore, hedging with derivatives is unsuitable for long-tail
lines, such as liability insurance.
Basis risk is often a question of whether the indices are
accurate assessments of losses. One way to measure the basis risk
of CAT options is to study the "industry" trigger and then adjust
for market share. For example, a $10 billion trigger and a 1%
market share company in Florida translates to a $100 million
attachment point, which is the point at which the insurance would
be activated. Insurers can use historical data for these
calculations and the resulting theoretical numbers can then be
compared with actual damage. The closer these figures are, the
more accurate the index and the lower the basis risk (Schauble 1).
The ISO index was tested after the Northridge earthquake in
Los Angeles. Northridge was the biggest catastrophe to occur
since the CBOT listed catastrophe contracts, so the earthquake was
a good test for the accuracy of the index (Lane 1). The
earthquake was covered by the March, 1994 contract, and ISO's loss
estimates as of March 31, 1994 were approximately $2.2 billion.
At the same time, pes loss estimates were $4.5 billion and A.M.
Best estimates were $5.3 billion (Lane 2). Obviously, ISO's
figures were low. However, there are five possible explanations
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for these differences. First, ISO does not try to estimate
ultimate net loss, which is the object of A.M. Best's estimates.
Second, none of ISO's sample companies are on A.M. Best's "under
review" list.

This removes companies that are writing more poorly

than others from the index.

Third, perils covered by the ISO

index differ from those in A.M. Best's loss estimations.

For

instance, both sprinkler damage and fire following an earthquake
are not considered ISO perils but are on A.M. Best's list of
perils. Table I illustrates this idea further.
TABLE

I:

Losses according to ISO

CALIFORNIA
4th Qtr
1st Qtr
1993
1994
(INTERIM)
(FINAL)
LINES
2.0
Allied Lines
2.3
Commercial Auto PD
0.1
0.8
Commercial Multi-Peril
1.8
259.1
EARTHQUAKE
1833.5
0.0
Farm
0.8
1.5
0.2
0.4
Fire
Homeowners/Mobile
18.6
18.6
Inland Marine
2.8
101. 6
2.7
Personal Auto PD
30.8
TOTAL
29.1
2,248.6
Premium Base
1,819.5
1,746.1
Loss Ratio
1. 7%
129.6%

ALL OTHER STATES
4th Qtr
1st Qtr
1993
1994
(FINAL)
(INTERIM)
12.1
22.4
3.0
10.4
14.7
23.5
0.0
1.0
8.1
5.1
1.3
1.5
77.4
164.0
34.8
64.3
86.8
39.2
247.7
324.2
10,495.9
11,164.8
2.4%
2.9%
(Lane 2)

The table shows ISO's loss figures for the December 1993
contract and the interim results for the March 1994 contract,
which includes the Northridge earthquake.

Losses are further

divided into two groups, California and all other states.

This

table demonstrates that the Northridge Earthquake had substantial
effect on only four lines of coverage: earthquake, commercial
mUlti-peril, inland marine, and personal auto PD (physical
damage).

It is also interesting to note that winter storm damage

did not affect ISO's loss estimates.

This is because "freeze" and

"flood" are also not included in the loss index (Lane 2).

The

fourth explanation is that the lack of IBNR losses in the ISO
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index creates a significant difference in estimates. Finally, the
ISO is concerned with pure loss while A.M. Best takes loss
adjustment expenses into account. As mentioned earlier, the CBOT
has attempted to improve upon some of these differences in PCS
options. Like A.M. Best, PCS considers all perils and include
IBNR. However, like ISO they are concerned with pure loss only
(3). These flaws were exemplified in ISO's final loss ratio for
the contract covered by the Northridge Earthquake. The March,
1994 contract closed with a 105.8% loss ratio, or a $26,450
settlement price per contract. Considering the catastrophe's
final losses totaled $12.5 billion, these figures were extremely
low (Lane 2). As Dena Karras, who is in charge of market
development for the Chicago Board of Trade, says, "We're only as
good as the industry reports we get ... If those are slow and
underestimated, there isn't much we can do" (Schachner, "CBOT CAT
Instruments ... " 71). Unfortunately, insurance companies can only
hedge as well as their losses correlate with the index.
Once again, there is a solution to the problem of basis
risks. First, as the CBOT makes improvements to the index, basis
risk will decrease. The PCS index is already one improvement over
the ISO index. Second, reinsurance companies could fill in the
gap by selling coverage for basis risks. For example, primary
companies could purchase reinsurance for fire following an
earthquake, which is a peril not covered by catastrophe options.
Proponents of insurance catastrophe options remain optimistic
because all of these problems are solvable. Prospective buyers
and sellers simply need time to learn about the market and
acclimate themselves to the new idea. Insurers have been buying
reinsurance for a long time and it is not surprising that they
need some convincing in order to leave that security. However,
with a little education, investors' misconceptions could be
corrected (McCullough 35). One suggestion for finding solutions
to many of the CAT options obstacles is for the CBOT to interact
with potential investors. This would encourage participation and
perhaps even create other derivatives (35). Richard Sandor,
chairman and chief executive officer of Center Trading Partners in
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New York and a pioneer in the field of financial futures, believes
that, "Like all things, it will take time and education. If you
recall, 10 years ago we were using typewriters, not PCs"
(Schachner, "CBOT CAT Instruments .•. " 70).
PRICING
The Problem
The hottest topic related to catastrophe insurance options is
their pricing. In fact, lack of a generally accepted pricing
model is probably the main reason the market has not been more
successful. Within the pricing debate, expected losses are
obviously the major factor. Many methods of predicting losses are
based on historical data and the assumption that loss trends of
the past will continue into the future. However, due to the low
frequency of catastrophes, historical data is often lacking (Lane
and Finn 2). Hence, it seems beneficial to study a longer period
of time in which case inflation becomes an important consideration
(Cozzolino 3). On the other hand, the magnitude of catastrophe
losses has increased over the years. Explanations for this
include an increase in population density along coastal regions
and increased construction costs. This suggests studying a more
recent history (Lane and Lobo, A Simple Approach 2). Obviously,
trying to predict the future by studying historical trends has
numerous complications and involves making many assumptions. It
is possible, however, to make an educated guess. Reinsurance
companies do it every day.
Reinsurance Pricing Methods
Each reinsurance company uses its own pricing method and one
could spend years trying to learn them all. Three common methods
of pricing catastrophe reinsurance are Pareto, comparable cover,
and experience rating. All three methods use past loss experience
(Lane and Finn 2). The Pa eto distribution, which models the
severity of catastrophes, is often used in conjunction with the
Poisson distribution, which models frequency (Cozzolino 5). The
Pareto distribution has a "fat-tail" and is therefore a good
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estimate for extreme values of insured losses such as
catastrophes. The Poisson distribution, or "the distribution of
rare events," is well suited for measuring catastrophe frequency
(5). Reinsurers use the Pareto and Poisson distributions to fit
historical data and find the expected value of losses. This
method results in consistent pricing, but does not consider
factors such as the market's perception of catastrophe frequencies
or changes in supply and demand of risk capital (Lane and Finn 2).
Comparable cover consists of comparing a new reinsurance contract
to another one that is slightly different. For instance, one
contract may have more risk or less coverage. By making slight
adjustments to the original, a price can be established for the
new contract (Grandisson). Experience rating includes payback or
rate-an-line (Lane and Finn 2). Rate-on-line, or ROL, is the
ratio of premium to exposure. In other words, it is the premium
divided by the upper limit of coverage. Payback is l/ROL. The
resulting number tells reinsurers the minimum number of years they
would have to receive payments from the primary company in order
to pay for a loss of the policy limit, ignoring interest. This
does not take into consideration investment income. For instance,
a 5% ROL translates to a payback of 20. This means the reinsurer
does not want a loss to occur more than once every 20 years.
Otherwise, they will not have made enough money from the contract
to pay for a claim and still make a profit (Grandisson).
Many reinsurers also utilize modern technology to estimate
future catastrophe losses. Computer programs are becoming the
latest craze in today's reinsurance industry. One well-known
program is called CATMAP. To use this program, a reinsurer enters
data about the exposure being priced into the computer, such as
the premium and the location. The computer then applies Monte
Carlo simulations to 10,000 years worth of catastrophes.
Sometimes it assumes the best case scenario, in which there are no
losses, sometimes it assumes the worst case scenario, in which
full coverage is needed, and sometimes it assumes scenarios in
between. In the end, the program gives an average loss, which can
then be used to price the contract (Grandisson). CATMAP is just
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one of many of these types of programs. Eurocat, for example, is
another popular program and is designed for catastrophe coverage
in Europe. Other programs are designed for specific types of
catastrophes, such as windstorms or earthquakes.
unfortunately, Pareto, comparable cover, experience rating,
and computer programs are all based on historical data. Since
catastrophe losses have only recently become exceedingly high,
there is not enough historical data regarding losses in excess of
$1 billion. ThUS, reinsurance pricing models are not a suitable
solution for the pricing of catastrophe insurance options.
Perhaps the solution lies in the pricing of options.
Option Pricing
The value of options consists of two factors, time value and
intrinsic value. The time value is the difference between the
option value before and at the expiration date, and is affected by
the volatility of the underlying asset and the time to maturity.
The higher the volatility and the more time to maturity, the
greater the time value (CBOT, A User's Guide 18). Intrinsic value

is the difference between the strike price and the stock price.
An option has intrinsic value if it is in-the-money (18).
In 1973 in "The Journal of Political Economy", Fischer Black
and Myron Scholes published a model for the pricing of options
that "rocked the financial world" (Lane and Finn 2). Their model
has become commonly known as the Black-Scholes model. Most new
ideas for the pricing of options, including computer programs are
based on this formula. In the derivation of the Black-Scholes
formula, seven assumptions are made. They are:
1)

Short-term interest rate is known and is constant
through time.

2)

The asset price follows the lognormal random walk. The
variance rate of the return on the stock is constant.

3)

The stock pays no dividends or other distributions.
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4)

The option can only
known as a European
considered European
exercised until the

be exercised at maturity. This is
option. Catastrophe options are
options because they are not
settlement date.

5)

There are no transaction costs in buying or selling the
stock or the option.

6)

It is possible to borrow any fraction of the price of a
security to buy it or to hold it, at the short-term
interest rate.

7)

Short selling is permitted (Black and Scholes 640).

The Black-Scholes equation is
C(S,t) = S x N(dl) - (E)(e- rt ) x N(d2)
where
dl = logeS/E) + lr + 1/2o~litl
ot l/2
d2 = loglS/E) + lr - 1/2o~litl
ot l/2
and
S = current value of the underlying asset
E = exercise price
t = time to expiration
r = interest rate
a = volatility
(Wilmott 100).
The equation states the value of a call option as the
probability that the option will be exercised, N(d2), times the
discounted exercise price subtracted from the current stock price
multiplied by another probability factor, N(dl) (Nielsen 1). N(dl)
is the factor by which the present value of an exercised call
exceeds the current stock price (2). Both probability
distributions are risk-adjusted and assume that the distribution
of st,ock prices is lognormal (12).
Lars Tyge Nielsen, an Associate Professor of Finance at
INSEAD in France, explains the formula using a very simplified
method. Notice that the payoff of the call option at maturity T is
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if ST ~ E
otherwise
(3)•
The equation represents the fact that the value of the option
will be the difference between the value of the stock and the
price paid for the stock if the exercise price is less than the
value of the stock.

The payoff will be 0 if the exercise price is

greater than the stock price.

Assuming the option finishes in

the-money, this value has two components.
the exercise price.

One is the payment of

It is
Cl

=

-E

o

if ST ~ E
otherwise

The second component is the value of the stock, defined as
if ST ~ E
otherwise
(4) •

By finding the expected values of Cl and C2 separately, it is
easier to find the value of the option.

The current value of Cl is

the exercise price, discounted at a riskless rate to the present
value.

Thus

P{ST > E}, or the risk-adjusted probability that the option
will finish in-the-money, is N(d2).

Therefore, the present value

of the exercise price is

which is the second component of the Black-Scholes equation (4).
The expected value of C2 is a conditional expectation. That
is, it is the value of the option given that the option finishes
in-the-money.

In mathematical terms, this means
[E(ST ST > E)] X P{ST > E}
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Once again using a risk-adjusted probability for P, this
equal to
( e rt ) (S) x N( d 1)

lS

Nielsen then multiplied by e- rt to discount to present value,
which resulted in
S x N(d1)
( 6) •

Placing the two components together, once again results in
the Black-Scholes formula.
C(S,t)

= S x N(d1) - (E)(e- rt ) x N(d2)

Under the given assumptions, any derivative security that is
paid for up front and whose price depends only on'S' and 't' must
satisfy the Black-Scholes equation (Wilmott 44). It would
therefore seem that the formula would be perfect for those who
wish to invest in catastrophe insurance options. However, some of
the assumptions of the model are often incorrect.
The first problem stems from assuming that the stock price is
distributed lognormally. In reality, the stock market is not this
predictable. Likewise, this assumption does not apply to the
catastrophe options market since losses are not lognormally
distributed. In addition, the Black-Scholes model overprices deep
in-the-moneyoptions (Gibson 145). When a catastrophe strikes, a
CAT option will most likely be deep in-the-money, since losses,
and thus the index, will be very high. Therefore, the theoretical
price of the options at this time would be too high. Another
problem with the model has to do with the standard deviation, s,
which measures the variability of the stock price over a certain
periOd of time. Unfortunately, the assumption of constant
volatility is not always correct. This can be shown by finding
the implied volatility, which estimates volatility without the use
of historical data (Lane and Finn 3). It is calculated by
substituting r, S, E, t, and the market option price into the
Black-Scholes formula and solving for o. The result represents

25

the market's estimation of volatility. If t, r, and S are fixed,
the implied volatility should be constant. In reality, however,
options that are deep in-the-money have a greater implied
volatility than those at-the-money. The graph of this phenomena
is called the "volatility smile." Depending on market conditions,
the smile may be lopsided, or even a frown. Specifically,
catastrophe options are more volatile at the end of the season
(Lane and Finn 7). Furthermore, volatility is greatest during the
loss period (CBOT, A User's Guide 20). In any event, volatility
is not constant and there is a flaw in the Black-Scholes model
(Wilmott 66). Mark Rubinstein, finance professor at the
University of California at Berkeley, said "What people have
observed is that when stock prices go up, volatility tends to go
down. When stock prices go down, volatility goes up. Black
Scholes assumes that does not happen" (Hemmerick 1). It is
important to realize that historical volatility and implied
volatility are only estimations. The correct volatility is the
one which actually occurs. This is known as the realized
volatility (Lane and Finn 3).
The Insurance Value of Options
While most people associate the value of options with their
intrinsic values and their time values, many forget the feature
that distinguishes an option from other financial assets, the
insurance value. It is this component that insurance companies
are utilizing in catastrophe options. Therefore it is beneficial
to study it more closely by neutralizing the intrinsic and time
values (Brenner 25). One method for doing this is to assume the
present value of the strike price equals the current stock price.
Then
S = E x e- rt
{I}
where e- rt is the present value factor.
S x e rt

E

Then
{2}
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The option is therefore considered to be at-the-money on a forward
basis (26). {2} is substituted into the Black-Scholes equation
for dl and d2, obtaining
dl

0(t 1 / 2 )(1/2)
-0 ( t 1 / 2) ( 1 12

{3}

)

{4}

The cumulative normal density function can be written as:
N(d) = 1/2 + (2n)-1/2(d-d 3 /6+d S /40 ... ).

{5}

using a first order approximation, which means dropping any terms
that are of the third order or higher, and substituting equations
{3} and {4} into equation {5}, we arrive at
N(dl)

N(d2)
where

0t

= 1/2 + .2ot
1/2

{6}

.2ot

= O(t 1 / 2 ) is volatility.

{7}

Next, equations {2}, {6}, and

{7}, can be substituted into the Black-Scholes equation, obtaining
{8}

(28).
This result is the insurance value of the option. It can
also be thought of as the insurance premium (25). Furthermore,
the value of a put is
{9}

This is tabulated using the put-call parity, which says
p

C + (E)(e- r t )

-

S

{lO}

Notice that the two values are equal. This is because puts and
calls provide the same service, insurance, after the effects of
intrinsic and time values are taken away (26). For instance,
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investors who want to sell short are hoping the price of the stock
will decrease. In order to guard against the possibility of an
increase in stock price, investors can buy a call option. Then if
the price of the stock rises, the short sale will lose money, but
the investor can exercise call option. This transaction will make
Similarly, a put option can be
a profit and help offset losses.
bought to insure against a decrease in stock price.
The best method of pricing catastrophe insurance options
would combine the models for pricing options with models for
pricing catastrophe reinsurance. While finding the right
combination has proved to be a difficult and much debated subject,
there are a number of viable solutions.

Pricing Catastrophe Insurance Options
In 1993, Morton Lane and Steve Lobo of Lane Financial
published a simple suggestion to the problem of pricing
catastrophe options. They began their procedure by developing
synthetic histories from loss estimates from 1949 through 1992.
Lane and Lobo obtained their loss estimates from the Property
Claims Service and adjusted the data to a 1991 basis in five
different ways. The first three methods assumed a 6%, 10%, and
15% constant growth rate. In these cases, the formula is
Adjusted Loss = eX(current year loss)
where x = (assumed growth rate) x (1991 - current year) (Lane and
Lobo, A Simple Approach 6). The fourth method adjusted current
year losses assuming that the growth rate for a specific year is
equal to the growth in the Consumer Price Index between that year
and 1991 multiplied by the growth in the population between that
year and 1991. The formula is
Adjusted Loss =
(current year loss) x (1 + %.6. CPIcurrent year to
(1 + %L). populationcurrent year to 1991).

1991)

X
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The final method assumed that the growth rate lS equal to the
growth in nominal GNP between a specific year and 1991. This
formula is
Adjusted Loss =
(current year loss) x (1 + %tl GNPcurrent year to

1991)

(6).

Lane and Lobo then divided the adjusted losses by the 1991 premium
(2). Attachment I shows the resulting loss ratios for the
September Eastern Catastrophe.
Next, Lane and Lobo created histograms and placed the results
in bins, as shown in Attachment II.
Obviously, this can be done
for any of the five adjusted loss scenarios as well as any
catastrophe spread and contract quarter. As an example, the
results on Table III assume a 10% constant growth rate and the
40/60 spread.
TABLE

III:

Index
Settle

Expected Value of the 40/60 CAT Spread

Frequency
CAl

<40
>40
>50
>60

&
&

Total

<50
<60

38
1
1
4
44

Probability

40/60 CAT

( Bl

Settle
(C l

86.36%
2.27%
2.27%
9.09%

0.0
5.0
15.0
20.0

AI (Sum of A) =

Expected
Value
= BxC
0.00
0.11
0.34
1. 82

Expected Value of 40/60 Spread 2.27
(Lane and Lobo, A Simple Approach 2)

Column A displays the frequencies from the information in
Attachment II. The probability of a loss ratio being below 40,
between 40 and 50, between 50 and 60, are given in column B. The
settlement value of each scenario, which was the midpoint of the
loss ratio bin, is given in column C. The expected value of the
spread, which in this case is 2.27 (2).
As mentioned earlier, historical data of catastrophes has
changed over the years. Therefore, it may be more desirable to
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apply the same method to more recent history.

Table IV displays

the results of such an application.

Expected Value of the 40/60 CAT Spread

TABLE IV:
Index
Settle
<40
>40
>50
>60

&
&

Frequency

Probability

AI (Sum of A);;::
(A)
8
0
0

<50
<60

(B)
80.00%
0.00%
0.00%
20.00%

2

Total

40/60 CAT
Settle
(C)
0.0
5.0
15.0
20.0

Expected Value of 40/60 Spread

10

Expected
Value
BxC
0
0

0
4.00
4.00

(Lane and Lobo, A Simple Approach 3)
This expected value was calculated using data from the last
ten years only.

As predicted, the resulting expected value is

higher, which suggests a higher premium (3).

Again, an increase

in population density in the coastal regions and increased
construction costs have resulted in higher catastrophic losses.
Thus, when more recent historical data is used, expected losses
are higher.
The expected value method has another useful application.

It

can be used to compare the relative prices of different CAT
spreads, either for the same loss period or across different loss
periods.

For example, the expected value of the 60/80 catastrophe

spread is 1.48, while the 80/100 spread's expected value is 1.36.
These figures suggest that the expected values of catastrophe
spreads decline more rapidly at lower levels than at higher levels
(2) •

This is just one suggestion for the pricing of catastrophe
options.

There are many others.

For instance, a separate

distribution could be modeled for each cause of losses.

In other

words, hurricanes, snowstorms, earthquakes, and other types of
catastrophes would have their own distribution (Lane and Lobo, A
Simple Approach 3).

Another possibility is a model that somehow

accounted for IBNR.

Unfortunately, until a generally accepted

method is found for pricing these options the confusion and
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uncertainty will only serve to hinder this market's chances for
success.
One effect of this pricing confusion is that it makes it
difficult for insurance companies to know if they are paying a
reasonable price for this form of reinsurance. One way to get a
better idea of the fairness of an option price is to study implied
loss distributions. The idea behind implied loss distributions,
or ILDs, is similar to that of implied volatility. Catastrophic
losses are often assumed to follow some statistical distribution.
The distribution is fitted to historical data and it is 0 ce again
assumed that the trend will continue into the future. Like
implied volatility, this process can be reversed by using market
premiums to derive the best statistical distribution of losses
(Lane and Finn 2).
Since option pricing models assume that the price of the
underlying asset is lognormally distributed, the price of a call
option is the expected value of all outcomes in which the option
finishes in-the-money. This is discounted to present value. Then
Options Price = PV

~[(valuei)(probabilitYi)]

where valuei is the ith price minus the strike price and the
probabilitYi is the lognormally distributed probability of that
outcome. However, this distribution is not appropriate for
catastrophic losses because the probability of a catastrophe lS
too small and the normal distribution does not have a long enough
tail. With the proper parameters, a Gamma distribution has a long
enough tail (3). Lane Financial used a proprietary algorit,hm to
search the Gamma distributions and select the one that best fits
the current market prices. The resulting implied loss distribution
lS an explanation for those prices (4).
Attachment III shows the ILDs for the third quarter Eastern
catastrophes, whi.ch is where the most trading has taken place. An
important observation to make is that there is a significant
difference in the ILDs of the three years. The 1993 line reflects
the fact that insurers believed that the probability of high
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catastrophe losses were low compared to the probability of lower
losses. In 1994, the market thought that the probability of large
events was greater compared to 1993, while their perception of the
probability of smaller events was lower than in 1993. One
possible explanation for this belief is the occurrence of the
Northridge Earthquake in January of 1994. Insurers became scared
and therefore, demand went up and they were willing to pay more
for coverage, and they did. 1995 prices settled in between the
previous two years. The changes in these prices can also be seen
in Table V, which gives the theoretical prices of 50 and 150
calls, using rate-on-line (4).
TABLE V:

50 Call
150 Call

Theoretical
1993

11%
4%

Prices
1994

(ROL%)
1995

20%
15%
11%
7%
(Lane and Finn 4)

Table V once again illustrates that changes in supply and demand,
in the both the reins ranee market and at the Chicago Board of
Trade, have a great effect on the prices. Insurers can also use
theoretical ROLs to compare the prices of catastrophe options with
traditional reinsurance.
Insurers can also measure the value of options by comparing
theoretical prices to the actual bid and ask prices. Table VI
displays the theoretical prices with the bid and ask prices as of
February 15, 1995.
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TABLE

VI:

Instrument
Calls
100
150
190
Call Spreads
35/55
45/65
50/70
60/80
140/160

Actual VB. Theoretical Prices
Eastern Cat.ast.ropbe Cont.ract.s
Third Quart.er 1995

Bid/Ask

Theoretical Price

8.5/12.0
4.0/5.5
0.2/0.9

10.0
3.5
0.5

6.2/7.5
6.0/6.5
5.3/5.5
4.0/5.5
1.5/2.0

7.0
6.1
5.7
5.0
1.9
(Lane and Finn 7-8)

According to Table VI, pricing is reasonable, with the
exception of the 150 call, which is overpriced, and the 50/70 call
spread, which is underpriced (8).
PREDICTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
At the present time, catastrophe options are not being
utilized to their fullest potential. This is probably largely due
to a fear of the unknown. In other words, "CBOT insurance options
have not taken off yet because they just don't look like
insurance" (Sclafane 6). Insurance companies are not risk-takers.
On the contrary, they are well-known for their stable,
conservative philosophies and thus, none of them want to be
pioneers in this new market. However, if companies would just
give catastrophe options a chance, they could be very successful.
As stated earlier, the market is caught in a catch-22. No one
wants to buy CAT options because no one else is buying CAT
options, but if insurers would enter the market, others would
follow and performance would improve.
What can be done to increase trading? The answer is in the
pricing. In fact, this problem has occurred before. Prior to
1973, options were bought and sold over-the-counter and trading
was "virtually non-existent" (Copeland 283). On April 26, 1973,
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the Chicago Board of Options Exchange, or CBOE, introduced options
for trading (240). At nearly the same time, Fischer Black and
Myron Scholes introduced their pricing model. By the end of 1974,
volume of the CBOE was larger than that of the American Stock
Exchange, and today, options are co sidered an integral part of
the stock market. In fact, the volume of options traded daily on
the New York Stock Exchange is greater than that of physical
stocks. Trading has expanded to include markets such as Tokyo,
London, Paris, Singapore, and Geneva (Gibson 181). The
publication of the Black-Scholes pricing model was most likely a
major factor in the explosion in the volume of trading. A similar
phenomena could occur for catastrophe options.
In the end, as in all markets, supply and demand determine
prices for futures, options, and insurance. The market sets the
ultimate price and as Table V illustrated, it is setting a fair
one for CAT options. Insurers simply need a model to assure
themselves that they are paying a good price for their coverage.
Once a standardized method of pricing is found, history could
repeat itself and catastrophe insurance options would be a
substantial addition to the capital market.

Attachment
Synthetic

I

History

Simulated Settlement Values
for September Eastern Catastrophe Contract
Adjustmen factor for losses
Loss

Number

6% Constant

10% Constant

15% Constant

CPI&

Year

Quarter

of Events

Growth

Growth

Growth

Population

GNP

1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

1
0
0
0
1
4
2
1
0
1
2
1
2
0
1
2
1
0
3
0
2
1
5
1
3
2
3
4
5
5
7
5
3
0
3
1
4
2
4
5
4
1
2
5

1.80%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.18%
24.82%
4.50%
0.53%
0.00%
0.63%
2.49%
10.22%
11.03%
0.00%
0.47%
7.00%
42.86%
0.00%
6.22%
0.00%
10.92%
19.11%
1.55%
0.00%
0.45%
0.81%
5.72%
1.19%
3.14%
0.49%
33.58%
2.24%
0.37%
0.00%
19.41 %
0.96%
25.36%
0.40%
1.22%
1.78%
61.73%
0.19%
10.79%
178.27%

9.68%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.82%
109.03%
19.01 %
2.14%
0.00%
2.37%
8.97%
35.32%
36.61 %
0.00%
1.44%
20.61%
121.25%
0.00%
16.25%
0.00%
26.32%
44.26%
3.46%
0.01%
0.92%
1.60%
10.85%
2.17%
5.50%
0.83%
54.26%
3.47%
0.55%
0.00%
26.74%
1.27%
32.24%
0.49%
1.43%
2.01%
66.87%
0.19%
10.79%
171.28%

79.04%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
5.49%
693.39%
114.99%
12.33%
0.00%
12.34%
44.41%
166.42%
164.10%
0.00%
5.83%
79.49%
444.89%
0.00%
53.95%
0.00%
79.08%
126.48%
9.40%
0.02%
2.27%
3.74%
24.16%
4.59%
11.08%
1.59%
98.87%
6.02%
0.91%
0.00%
39.89%
1.80%
43.52%
0.63%
1.75%
2.33%
73.90%
0.20%
10.79%
162.92%

1.35%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.15%
20.97%
4.00%
0.49%
0.00%
0.60%
2.42%
10.24%
11.35%
0.00%
0.52%
7.95%
50.54%
0.00%
7.67%
0.00%
13.74%
23.80%
1.93%
0.00%
0.57%
1.00%
6.62%
1.36%
3.58%
0.55%
36.16%
2.22%
0.35%
0.00%
17.81%
0.89%
23.89%
0.38%
1.21%
1.78%
62.13%
0.19%
10.79%
182.51 %

3.12%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.28%
40.53%
7.09%
0.84%
0.00%
1.06%
4.11%
17.22%
18.95%
0.00%
0.80%
11.80%
70.85%
0.00%
10.02%
0.00%
16.77%
29.56%
2.35%
0.00%
0.62%
1.10%
7.56%
1.51%
3.74o/r
0.55%
35.85%
2.37%
0.37%
0.00%
19.37%
0.92%
24.29%
0.39%
1.18%
1.69%
58.06%
0.18%
10.58%
177.38%

I,

:

(Lane and Lobo r A Simple Approach 4)

Attachment

II

Histograms of Simulated Loss Ratios
for September Eastern Catastrophe Futures 1949-1992
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Attachment
Implied

Loss

III

Distributions

Third Quarter Eastern Contract
1993-1994

PROBABILITY OF LOSS
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Source: Lane Financial

(Lane and Finn 5)
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